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Abstract
The goal is to re-examine and extend the findings from the recent paper by Dumitrescu et
al. [11] who studied game options within the nonlinear arbitrage-free pricing approach developed
in El Karoui and Quenez [16]. We consider the setup introduced in Kim et al. [26] where
contracts of an American style were examined. We give a detailed study of unilateral pricing,
hedging and exercising problems for the counterparties within a general nonlinear setup. We
also present a BSDE approach, which is used to obtain more explicit results under suitable
assumptions about solutions to doubly reflected BSDEs.
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1 Introduction
Unlike contracts of an American style, the so-called game options are symmetric between the two
counterparties, hereafter referred to as the hedger and the counterparty, in the sense that both parties
have the right to stop the contract before its nominal maturity date, denoted as T . We adopt here the
convention according to which a random moment when the game contract is stopped by the hedger
is called a cancellation time whereas for the corresponding moment for the counterparty is called an
⁀exercise time. Within the framework of the classical Black-Scholes options pricing model, the notion
of an abstract game option was first introduced and studied by Kifer [24] who coined the term Israeli
option. His results were subsequently extended to a general (possibly incomplete) semimartingale
model by Kallsen and Ku¨hn [22]. Arbitrage-free pricing and rational cancellation/exercising of game
options (in particular, convertible bonds) within the framework of a linear market model have been
studied by several authors, to mention a few: Ayache et al. [1], Bielecki et al. [4], Dolinsky and
Kifer [9], Hamade´ne [20], Kallsen and Ku¨hn [22, 23], Matoussi et al. [33], Ku¨hn et al. [29] and
Kyprianou [30].
It is well known that valuation of game options, at least within the framework of a linear market
model, is closely related to the concept of the zero-sum two-person Dynkin stopping game, as first
introduced by Dynkin [13] and later modified by Neveu [34]. From the mathematical perspective,
one should also mention papers on Dynkin games and doubly reflected backward stochastic differen-
tial equations (DRBSDEs) that underpin valuation of game contract, in particular, Bayraktar and
Yao [2], Cre´pey and Matoussi [7], Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [8], Dumitrescu et al. [10], Essaky and
Hassani [17], Grigorova et al. [18], Grigorova and Quenez [19], Hamade`ne and Ouknine [21], and
Lepeltier and San Mart´ın [31]. The interested reader is referred to Kifer [25] for a recent survey of
results on Dynkin games and their applications to game options.
More recently, some authors have studied nonlinear variants of a Dynkin game and their ap-
plications to game options. The aim of this work is to re-examine and extend the findings from
Dumitrescu et al. [11] (see also [12] for the case of American options) who have studied game op-
tions within the framework of a particular imperfect market model with default using the nonlinear
arbitrage-free pricing approach developed in El Karoui and Quenez [16]. In contrast to [11], we place
ourselves within the setup of a general nonlinear arbitrage-free market, as introduced in Bielecki et
al. [3, 5], and we examine general properties of unilateral fair prices for the two counterparties.
Let us introduce the notation for a general nonlinear market model. We consider a filtered
probability space (Ω,G,G,P) satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness,
where the filtration G = (Gt)t∈[0,T ] models the flow of information available to all traders. For
convenience, the inception date of a contract under consideration is set to be 0 and it is assumed
that the initial σ-field G0 is trivial. Moreover, all processes introduced in what follows are implicitly
assumed to be G-adapted and, as usual, any semimartingale is assumed to be ca`dla`g. For the sake
of notational convenience, we assume throughout that trading conditions are identical for the two
counterparties, although this assumption can be relaxed without any difficulty by modifying the
notation. By convention, all cash flows of a contract are described from the perspective of the
hedger. Hence when a cash flow is positive for the hedger, then the cash amount is paid by the
counterparty and received by the hedger. Obviously, if a cash flow is negative for the hedger, then
the cash amount is transferred from the hedger to the counterparty. Let us state a formal definition
of a game contract.
Definition 1.1. A game contract with G-adapted, ca`dla`g processes A,Xh, Xc, Xb is a contract
between the two parties, called the hedger and the counterparty, where:
(i) σ ∈ T is chosen by the hedger and called the cancellation time,
(ii) τ ∈ T is chosen by the counterparty and called the exercise time.
The process A with A0 = 0 gives the cumulative cash flows of the contract up to its effective maturity
σ ∧ τ ∧ T . The contract expires at time σ ∧ τ ∧ T and its terminal payoff at time σ ∧ τ ∧ T , as seen
from the perspective of the hedger, is given by the following expression, for every σ, τ ∈ T ,
I(Xh, Xc, Xb;σ, τ) := Xhσ1{σ<τ} +X
c
τ1{τ<σ} +X
b
σ1{τ=σ}. (1)
Nonlinear Pricing of Game Options 3
For brevity, a game contract is denoted either as GCC (A,Xh, Xc, Xb, T ) or, simply, Cg. In the
existing literature, it is common to assume that the inequalities Xht < X
c
t and X
h
t ≤ X
b
t ≤ X
c
t are
satisfied for every t ∈ [0, T ]. In that case, the payoff process Xb in fact plays only a minor role,
since one can prove that the solutions to the hedging and valuation problems for the hedger and the
counterparty will depend only on the terminal value XbT and thus the values X
b
t for t ∈ [0, T ) are
immaterial. We will make these assumptions in Section 3 where we analyze a BSDE approach to
game options, since they are convenient when dealing with solutions to DRBSDEs. This should be
contrasted with the situation studied in Section 2, where we do not need to make any assumptions
about the ordering of the payoffs Xh, Xc and Xb.
An important element of arbitrage-free pricing in a nonlinear market is the concept of the bench-
mark wealth V b(x), that is, the process with respect to which arbitrage opportunities of a particular
trader are quantified and assessed. As in Bielecki and Rutkowski [5], Bielecki et al. [3] and Kim
et al. [26], the benchmark wealth can be given by the equality V b(x) = V 0(x) where, for any ini-
tial endowment x ∈ R of a trader, we set V 0(x) := xB0,l1{x≥0} + xB
0,b
1{x<0} where the risk-free
lending (respectively, borrowing) cash account B0,l (respectively, B0,b) is used for unsecured lending
(respectively, borrowing) of cash. Note that V 0(x) represents the wealth process of a trader who
decided at time 0 to keep his initial cash endowment x in either the lending (when x ≥ 0) or the
borrowing (when x < 0) cash account and who is not involved in any other trading activities be-
tween the times 0 and T . More generally, if a trader is endowed with an initial portfolio of assets
(including also the savings account B0,l and B0,b, which means that he can also be a borrower or a
lender of cash) with the current market value x at time 0 (ignoring bid-ask spreads and transaction
costs), then V b(x) stands for the wealth process of the trader’s static portfolio under the postulate
that it is hold unchanged till the date T . By convention, the quantities x1 and x2 represent initial
endowments of the hedger and the counterparty, respectively, and thus the processes V 0(x1) and
V 0(x2) are their respective benchmark wealths. From the economic perspective, the notion of the
benchmark wealth can be seen as a plausible formalization of the well known idea of opportunity
costs, which is instrumental in financial decision making. Note also that, even if we set x1 = x2 = 0
and V bt (0) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], then, due to nonlinear dynamics of the wealth process, unilateral
prices will still be asymmetric. A particular choice for the benchmark process V b(x) is important in
practical applications, but it is immaterial for all results presented in this work.
In Section 2, we work in an abstract nonlinear setup, meaning that we only make very general
assumptions about the nonlinear dynamics of the wealth process of self-financing strategies. The
main assumptions of that kind are the forward monotonicity and the strict forward monotonic-
ity of wealth processes (see Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, respectively), the comparison and the strict
comparison postulates for trading strategies (Assumptions 2.3 and 2.6, respectively), as well as the
replicability postulates for the hedger and the counterparty (Assumptions 2.4 and 2.7, respectively).
The main result in Section 2 is Theorem 2.1 where we show that, under mild and natural assump-
tions about the underlying nonlinear market model, a unilateral hedger’s acceptable price for the
game contract is unique and corresponds to the fair price obtained through replication. To this end,
one needs to properly define the concepts of a fair price and replication of a game contract in a
nonlinear setup. Using the symmetric features of a game contract, we show in Theorem 2.2 that the
same properties of pricing are true for the counterparty as well.
In Section 3, we present a BSDE approach to game options in a fairly general setup. We obtain
there more explicit results regarding pricing, hedging and rational cancellation/exercise times using
a BSDE approach without being specific about the dynamics of underlying assets, but by focusing
instead on desirable properties of solutions to DRBSDEs. In Section 3.4, we show that the hedger’s
acceptable price can be characterized by a unique solution to the hedger’s DRBSDE. Next, in Section
3.5, we analyze the sets of hedger’s rational cancellation times and break-even times under the
postulate that the contract is traded at time 0 at the hedger’s acceptable price. The corresponding
results for the counterparty are stated without proofs in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. It should be noted that
the DRBSDEs for the hedger and the counterparty differ and thus, in general, unilateral acceptable
prices computed by the two counterparties will not coincide.
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2 Unilateral Fair Pricing
LetM = (B,S,Ψ) be a market model which is arbitrage-free with respect to European contracts in
the sense of Bielecki et al. [3, 5]. Here Ψ stands for the class of all admissible trading strategies and
Ψ(y,D) denotes the class of all admissible trading strategies from Ψ with the initial wealth y ∈ R
and with external cash flows D. For any trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,D), we denote by V (y, ϕ,D) the
wealth process of ϕ. Obviously, the equality V0(y, ϕ,D) = y holds for all y ∈ R and any strategy ϕ.
It is assumed throughout that the processes D,Xh, Xc and the wealth process V (y, ϕ,D) are ca`dla`g
and G-adapted. We will gradually make more assumptions about the dynamics of wealth processes.
2.1 Hedger’s Fair Prices
We first conduct a preliminary analysis of unilateral fair valuation from the hedger’s viewpoint.
Unlike in the case of options of an American style, which were studied by Kim et al. [26], the
symmetry of the game contract simplifies the analysis, in the sense that it suffices to address the
valuation and hedging problem for the hedger and, subsequently, to apply analogous arguments to
establish results pertaining to the counterparty.
We consider an extended market model, denoted as Mp(Cg), in which a game contract Cg =
GCC (A,Xh, Xc, Xb, T ) is traded at time 0 at some initial price p where p can be an arbitrary real
number. We first give a preliminary analysis of unilateral fair valuation of a game contract by the
hedger. We henceforth assume that the hedger (respectively, the counterparty) is endowed with an
initial pre-trading wealth of x1 ∈ R (respectively, x2 ∈ R) units of cash.
Note that, for brevity, the variables (A,Xh, Xc, Xb) are frequently omitted in what follows when
there is no danger of confusion; in particular, the payoff I(Xh, Xc, Xb;σ, τ) will be usually denoted
as I(σ, τ). Similarly, since the process A is fixed throughout, we will frequently write V (x1 + p, ϕ)
instead of V (x1 + p, ϕ,A) when dealing with the hedger. By the same token, we will later write
V (x2 − p, ψ) instead of V (x2 − p, ψ,−A) when examining trading strategies of the counterparty.
We introduce the following conditions regarding the presence (or absence) of unilateral hedger’s
gains with respect to his predetermined benchmark V b(x1).
Definition 2.1. A quadruplet (p, ϕ, σ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T × T is said to satisfy:
(AO) ⇐⇒ Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, τ) ≥ V bσ∧τ (x1)
and P
(
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, τ) > V
b
σ∧τ (x1)
)
> 0,
(SH) ⇐⇒ Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, τ) ≥ V bσ∧τ (x1),
(BE) ⇐⇒ Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, τ) = V bσ∧τ (x1),
(NA) ⇐⇒ either Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, τ) = V bσ∧τ (x1)
or P
(
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, τ) < V
b
σ∧τ (x1)
)
> 0.
Let us explain the meaning of acronyms appearing in Definition 2.1: (AO) stands for arbitrage
opportunity, (SH) for superhedging, (BE) for break-even and (NA) for no-arbitrage. For a detailed
explanation of each property, see Definitions 2.2–2.5.
Definition 2.2. If condition (BE) is satisfied by a quadruplet (p, ϕ, σ, τ), then a stopping time
τ ∈ T is called a hedger’s break-even time for (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T .
Property (SH) of (p, ϕ, σ, τ) is referred to as the hedger’s superhedging at time τ . In view of the
optional section theorem, it is easy to see that property (SH) holds for a given triplet (p, ϕ, σ) ∈
R×Ψ(x1+p,A)×T and all τ ∈ T if and only if Vσ∧t(x1+p, ϕ)+I(σ, t) ≥ V bσ∧t(x1) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
This observation justifies the following definition of property (SH) for a triplet (p, ϕ, σ).
Definition 2.3. We say that a triplet (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1+p,A)×T satisfies condition (SH) if the
inequality Vσ∧t(x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, t) ≥ V
b
σ∧t(x1) holds for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In that case, a triplet (p, ϕ, σ)
is called a hedger’s superhedging strategy in the extended market Mp(Cg).
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Property (AO) is referred to as the hedger’s strict superhedging condition (or the hedger’s arbi-
trage opportunity) for (p, ϕ, σ) at time τ . Note that if a triplet (p, ϕ, σ) is such that the inequality
Vσ∧t(x1 + p, ϕ) + I(σ, t) > V
b
σ∧t(x1) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ], then condition (AO) is satisfied by
(p, ϕ, σ) for every τ ∈ T , but the converse implication does not hold, in general.
Definition 2.4. We say that a triplet (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ R × Ψ(x1 + p,A) × T satisfies condition (AO) if
a quadruplet (p, ϕ, σ, τ) complies with (AO) for all τ ∈ T . In that case, we also say that (p, ϕ, σ)
creates a hedger’s arbitrage opportunity in the extended market Mp(Cg). We say that no hedger’s
arbitrage arises for (p, ϕ, σ) if there exists τ ∈ T such that the quadruplet (p, ϕ, σ, τ) satisfies (NA).
Definition 2.5. We say that pf,h(x1) = p
f,h(x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) is a hedger’s fair price for Cg if no
hedger’s arbitrage opportunity (p, ϕ, σ) may arise in the extended marketMp(Cg) when p = pf,h(x1).
The set of hedger’s fair prices equals
Kf,h(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∀ (ϕ, σ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T ∃ τ ∈ T : (p, ϕ, σ, τ) ∈ (NA)
}
and the upper bound for the hedger’s fair prices equals pf,h(x1) := supKf,h(x1). If the equality
pf,h(x1) = maxKf,h(x1) is satisfied (that is, if p
f,h(x1) ∈ Kf,h(x1)), then p
f,h(x1) is denoted as
p̂f,h(x1) and called the hedger’s maximum fair price for Cg.
Assumption 2.1. The forward monotonicity of wealth holds meaning that for all x, p ∈ R, ϕ ∈
Ψ(x+ p,A) and p′ > p (respectively, p′ < p), there exists a trading strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x+ p′, A) such
that Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) ≥ Vt(x+ p, ϕ) (respectively, Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) ≤ Vt(x+ p, ϕ)) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Under the postulate of the forward monotonicity of wealth, we obtain the interval structure of
the fair prices set.
Lemma 2.1. Let Assumption 2.1 be satisfied. If p ∈ Kf,h(x1) then for any p
′ < p, we have that
p′ ∈ Kf,h(x1). Therefore, if Kf,h(x1) 6= ∅, then either Kf,h(x1) = (−∞, p
f,h] = (−∞, p̂f,h] or
Kf,h(x1) = (−∞, p
f,h).
Proof. We argue by contradiction. If Kf,h(x1) = ∅, then p
f,h = −∞. Let us now consider the
case where Kf,h(x1) 6= ∅. Assume that p ∈ Kf,h(x1) and a number p′ such that p′ < p is not an
hedger’s fair price. Then there exists ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p′, A) such that (p′, ϕ′, τ) satisfy (AO) for every
τ ∈ T . Consequently, by Assumption 2.1, there exists ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) such that (p, ϕ, τ) satisfy
(AO) for every τ ∈ T . This clearly contradicts the assumption that p belongs to Kf,h(x1) and thus
we conclude that the asserted properties are valid. ✷
2.2 Hedger’s Superhedging Costs
In the next step, we analyze the hedger’s superhedging costs for the game contract.
Definition 2.6. The lower bound for the hedger’s strict superhedging costs equals
pa,h(x1) = p
a,h(x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) := inf Ka,h(x1)
where
Ka,h(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ϕ, σ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T : (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ (AO)
}
.
If the equality pa,h(x1) := minKa,h(x1) holds, then pa,h(x1) is denoted as p˘a,h(x1) and called the
hedger’s minimum strict superhedging cost for Cg.
For conciseness, the variables (x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) or x1 will be frequently suppressed when dealing
with the hedger’s valuation problem and thus we will write pa,h instead of pa,h(x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) or
pa,h(x1), etc. Notice that Ka,h(x1) is the complement of Kf,h(x1) and thus either
Kf,h(x1) = (−∞, p̂
f,h ] and Ka,h(x1) = (p
a,h,∞) (2)
or
Kf,h(x1) = (−∞, p
f,h ) and Ka,h(x1) = [ p˘
a,h,∞). (3)
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Definition 2.7. The lower bound for the hedger’s superhedging costs equals
ps,h(x1) = p
s,h(x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) := inf Ks,h(x1)
where
Ks,h(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ϕ, σ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T : (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ (SH)
}
.
If the equality ps,h(x1) := minK
s,h(x1) holds, then p
s,h(x1) is denoted as p˘
s,h(x1) and called the
hedger’s minimum superhedging cost for Cg.
Since Ka,h(x1) ⊆ Ks,h(x1), we always have that ps,h ≤ pa,h but, in principle, it may occur that
ps,h < pa,h = pf,h. To avoid this awkward situation, we introduce Assumption 2.2, which ensures
that ps,h = pa,h and thus also ps,h = pf,h.
Assumption 2.2. The strict forward monotonicity of wealth holds meaning that for all x, p ∈
R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x+p,A) and p′ > p (respectively, p′ < p), there exists a trading strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x+p′, A)
such that Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) > Vt(x+ p, ϕ) (respectively, Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) < Vt(x+ p, ϕ)) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Obviously, Assumption 2.2 of the strict forward monotonicity of wealth is stronger than Assump-
tion 2.1 of forward monotonicity of wealth and thus the former encompasses the latter.
Lemma 2.2. If Assumption 2.2 is satisfied, then pf,h = ps,h = pa,h.
Proof. Let us first assume that Ks,h(x1) 6= ∅ so that ps,h < ∞. Since Assumption 2.2 holds, it is
clear that for any p ∈ Ks,h(x1) and arbitrary ε > 0, there exists a strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p + ε, A)
such that condition (AO) is satisfied by the pair (p + ε, ϕ′). This means that p + ε belongs to
Ka,h(x1) and thus p + ε ≥ pa,h. From the arbitrariness of p ∈ Ks,h(x1) and ε > 0, we obtain the
inequality ps,h ≥ pa,h. Since ps,h ≤ pa,h, it is clear that ps,h = pa,h. Using also (2) and (3), especially
Ka,h(x1) is the complement of Kf,h(x1), we obtain the equality p
f,h = pa,h and thus we conclude
that pf,h = ps,h = pa,h. Let us now assume that Ks,h(x1) = ∅. Then ps,h = pa,h = ∞ and, since
Kf,h(x1) is the complement of Ka,h(x1), we see that p
f,h =∞ as well. ✷
2.3 Hedger’s Replication Costs
The next step is to introduce the concept of a replication cost. Let (p, ϕ, σ) be a hedger’s super-
hedging strategy such that he breaks even at σ∧ τ when the exercise time τ is coincidentally chosen
by his counterparty. Then we say that (p, ϕ, σ) is a hedger’s replicating strategy for a game contract.
Definition 2.8. The lower bound for hedger’s replication costs for Cg is given by the equality
pr,h(x1) = p
r,h(x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) := inf Kr,h(x1)
where
Kr,h(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ϕ, σ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T × T : (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ (SH) & (p, ϕ, σ, τ) ∈ (BE)
}
.
If the equality pr,h(x1) := minKr,h(x1) holds, then pr,h(x1) is denoted as p˘r,h(x1) and called the
hedger’s minimum replication cost for Cg.
Definition 2.9. The lower bound for hedger’s fair replication costs for Cg is given by the equality
pf,r,h(x1) = p
f,r,h(x1, X
h, Xc, Xb) := inf Kf,r,h(x1)
where
Kf,r,h(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ϕ, σ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T × T : (p, ϕ, σ) ∈ (SH) & (p, ϕ, σ, τ) ∈ (BE);
∀ (ϕ′, σ′) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T , ∃ τ
′ ∈ T : (p, ϕ′, σ′, τ ′) ∈ (NA)
}
.
If pf,r,h(x1) := minK
f,r,h(x1), then p
f,r,h(x1) is denoted as p˘
f,r,h(x1) and called the hedger’s mini-
mum fair replication cost for Cg.
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It is readily seen that Ks,h(x1) ⊇ Kr,h(x1) ⊇ Kf,r,h(x1) = Kf,h(x1) ∩ Kr,h(x1) and thus ps,h ≤
pr,h ≤ pf,r,h.
Lemma 2.3. Let Assumption 2.2 be satisfied.
(i) If Kf,r,h(x1) 6= ∅, then −∞ < p̂f,h = p˘r,h = p˘f,r,h = p˘s,h < +∞.
(ii) If Kr,h(x1) 6= ∅, then p
f,h = ps,h ≤ pr,h <∞.
(iii) If Kr,h(x1) = ∅, then p
f,h = ps,h ≤ pr,h =∞.
Proof. We first prove part (i). It is clear that it in enough to show pf,r,h ≤ ps,h. For this purpose,
we notice that Kf,r,h(x1) ⊆ Kf,h(x1). Since Kf,r,h(x1) 6= ∅, it follows that pf,r,h < +∞ and
pf,r,h ≤ pf,h. Consequently, the equalities pf,h = pr,h = pf,r,h = ps,h are valid. Moreover, from
the inclusion Kf,r,h(x1) ⊆ Kf,h(x1) and the equalities sup Kf,h(x1) = p
f,h = pf,r,h = inf Kf,r,h(x1),
we deduce that for arbitrary p1, p2 ∈ Kf,r,h(x1) and p3 ∈ Kf,h(x1) we have that p1 = p2 ≥ p3.
This means that Kf,r,h(x1) is a singleton and its unique element is not less than any element of
Kf,h(x1). Consequently, p̂f,h and p˘f,r,h are well defined and satisfy −∞ < p̂f,h = p˘f,r,h < +∞.
Furthermore, Kf,r,h(x1) ⊆ K
r,h(x1) and thus the equality p˘
f,r,h = pr,h implies that p˘r,h is well
defined and is equal to p˘f,r,h. We conclude that p̂f,h = p˘r,h = p˘f,r,h = p˘s,h. This means, in
particular, that Kf,h(x1) = (−∞, p̂f,h] = (−∞, p˘r,h] = (−∞, p˘f,r,h]. Statements (ii) and (iii) are
obvious consequences of Lemma 2.2. ✷
2.4 Hedger’s Acceptable Price
We will henceforth work under the following postulate of the (backward) comparison property for
trading strategies.
Assumption 2.3. The comparison property for trading strategies holds meaning that for all τ ∈
T , x, p, p′ ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x+ p,A) and ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x+ p′, A), if the inequality Vτ (x+ p′, ϕ′) ≥ Vτ (x+ p, ϕ)
holds, then p′ ≥ p.
Under Assumption 2.3, if for some G-adapted process X and a given stopping time θ ∈ T there
exists a pair (x, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x,A) satisfying Vθ(x, ϕ) = Xθ, then x is unique and it is denoted by
Eh0 (Xθ). We set X
l
t := V
b
t (x1)−X
c
t , X
u
t := V
b
t (x1)−X
h
t and X
m
t := V
b
t (x1)−X
b
t for every t ∈ [0, T ]
and we denote
J(x1, X
l, Xu, Xm, σ, τ) := V bσ∧τ (x1)− I(σ, τ) = X
l
τ1{τ<σ} +X
u
σ1{σ<τ} +X
m
σ 1{τ=σ}. (4)
The hedger’s relative reward J(x1, X
l, Xu, Xm, σ, τ) will be henceforth denoted as Jh(σ, τ). Note
that it is not postulated in Section 2 that X l ≤ Xm ≤ Xu, although we will need to make this
assumption later on when addressing the hedger’s valuation problem using a BSDE approach studied
in Section 3.
The following assumption is used to ensure that the quantity Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)) is well defined for all
stopping times σ, τ ∈ T .
Assumption 2.4. We assume that the process Jh is replicable for the hedger, in the sense that
for a given x1 ∈ R and every σ, τ ∈ T there exists a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x1 + p,A) such that
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) = J
h(σ, τ).
The following lemma is obvious and thus its proof is omitted.
Lemma 2.4. If Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4 are satisfied, then the hedger’s nonlinear evaluation
(σ, τ) 7→ Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)) is well defined for all σ, τ ∈ T and is unique.
Definition 2.10. We say that a triplet (vh0 (x1), σ
∗,h, τ∗,h) ∈ R×T ×T solves the hedger’s optimal
replication problem for Cg if vh0 (x1) = E
h
0 (J
h(σ∗,h, τ∗,h))−x1 where the stopping times σ∗,h and τ∗,h
are such that
Eh0 (J
h(σ∗,h, τ∗,h)) = min
σ∈T
max
τ∈T
Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)). (5)
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Assumption 2.5. The hedger’s optimal replication problem for Cg has a solution (vh0 (x1), σ
∗,h, τ∗,h).
Furthermore, for p∗,h = vh0 (x1) there exists a trading strategy ϕ
∗ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p∗,h, A) such that the
triplet (p∗,h, ϕ∗, σ∗,h) satisfies condition (SH) and the quadruplet (p∗,h, ϕ∗, σ∗,h, τ∗,h) complies with
condition (BE), so that the set Kr,h(x1) is nonempty.
Remark 2.1. Notice that the hedger’s optimal replication problem does not hinge on the existence
of a saddle point for the nonlinear Dynkin game associated with Eh and Jh. To be more specific,
we do not assume that the corresponding nonlinear Dynkin game has the value, in the sense that
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)) = sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)).
Lemma 2.5. If Assumptions 2.3–2.5 are met, then ps,h(x1) ≥ vh0 (x1).
Proof. The assertion is trivial when Ks,h(x1) = ∅ since then ps,h(x1) = ∞. Let thus p belong to
Ks,h(x1) 6= ∅. Then there exists a pair (ϕ, σ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) × T such that (p, ϕ, σ) satisfies (SH)
so that Vσ∧t(x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ Jh(σ, t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently, for all τ ∈ T , we have that
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ J
h(σ, τ) and, due to Assumption 2.3, this implies that for all τ ∈ T , we have
x1 + p ≥ Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)). It is now easy to see
x1 + p ≥ sup
τ∈T
Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)) ≥ inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)).
Using equation (5) and Assumption 2.5, we conclude that p ≥ vh0 (x1). Since p ∈ K
s,h(x1) was
arbitrary, this yields the desired inequality. ✷
Lemma 2.6. If Assumptions 2.2–2.5 are met, then pf,h(x1) ≤ vh0 (x1).
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that pf,h(x1) > v
h
0 (x1). From Assumption 2.5, for
p∗,h = vh0 (x1) there exists a trading strategy ϕ
∗ ∈ Ψ(x1+p∗,h, A) such that Vσ∗,h∧τ∗,h(x1+p
∗,h, ϕ∗) =
J(σ∗,h, τ∗,h) and the triplet (p∗,h, ϕ∗, σ∗,h) satisfies (SH). Consequently, in view of Assumption 2.2,
for any p′ > vh0 (x1) there exists ϕ
′ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p′, A) such that (p′, ϕ′, σ∗,h) is a hedger’s strict
superhedging strategy. This contradicts the assumption that pf,h(x1, X
c, Xh, Xb) > vh0 (x1), since
we have shown that if p belongs to the interval (vh0 (x1), p
f,h(x1)), then p
′ ∈ Kf,h(x1)∩K
a,h(x1) = ∅
(recall that Ka,h(x1) is the complement of Kf,h(x1)). ✷
The next assumption, which is manifestly stronger than Assumption 2.3, is crucial to ensure that
the solution vh0 (x1) to the hedger’s optimal replication problem yields the hedger’s maximum fair
price p̂f,h(x1).
Assumption 2.6. For all τ ∈ T , x, p, p′ ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x+p,A) and ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x+p′, A), if the inequality
Vτ (x + p
′, ϕ′) ≥ Vτ (x + p, ϕ) holds, then p′ ≥ p. If, in addition, Vτ (x + p′, ϕ′) 6= Vτ (x + p, ϕ), then
p′ > p.
The next result shows that, under Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4–2.6, the hedger’s maximum fair
price coincides with the solution vh0 (x1) to the hedger’s optimal replication problem introduced in
Definition 2.10. It is useful to observe that
Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ)) − x1 =
{
p ∈ R | ∃ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) : Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) = J
h(σ, τ)
}
, (6)
where, in view of Assumption 2.6, the set in the right-hand side has only one element.
Theorem 2.1. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4–2.6 be valid. If p ∈ Ka,h(x1), then the inequality
p > vh0 (x1) holds and thus p̂
f,h(x1) = v
h
0 (x1). Moreover, K
f,r,h(x1) 6= ∅ and
vh0 (x1) = p̂
f,h(x1) = p˘
f,r,h(x1) = p˘
s,h(x1). (7)
The stopping time τ∗,h is a hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (p˘f,r,h(x1), ϕ
f,r,h, σ∗,h) where a
trading strategy ϕ = ϕf,r,h is implicitly given by equation (6) with (p, σ, τ) = (p˘f,r,h(x1), σ
∗,h, τ∗,h).
More explicitly, a trading strategy ϕf,r,h belongs to Ψ(x1 + p˘
f,r,h(x1), A) and is such that
Vσ∗,h∧τ∗,h
(
x1 + p˘
f,r,h(x1), ϕ
f,r,h
)
= Jh
(
σ∗,h, τ∗,h
)
.
Nonlinear Pricing of Game Options 9
Proof. We denote (noticing Assumption 2.3, the right side of the following equation is singleton)
pr,h(x1, σ, τ
∗,h) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) : (p, ϕ, σ, τ
∗,h) ∈ (BE)
}
. (8)
Let p be an arbitrary number from Ka,h(x1). Then there exists a pair (ϕ, σ) ∈ Ψ(x1+p,A)×T such
that for every τ ∈ T we have Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ Jh(σ, τ) and P
(
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) > J
h(σ, τ)
)
> 0.
Hence we obtain for τ = τ∗,h
Vσ∧τ∗,h(x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ J
h(σ, τ∗,h), P
(
Vσ∧τ∗,h(x1 + p, ϕ) > J
h(σ, τ∗,h)
)
> 0.
From equation (8) and Assumption 2.6, we get
V0(x1 + p, ϕ) = x1 + p > x1 + p
r,h(x1, σ, τ
∗,h),
but, in view of Assumption 2.5, we also have that
x1 + v
h
0 (x1) = E
h
0 (J
h(σ∗,h, τ∗,h)) ≤ Eh0 (J
h(σ, τ∗,h)) = x1 + p
r,h(x1, σ, τ
∗,h)
and thus p > vh0 (x1). From equation (2) and Lemma 2.6, we deduce that v
h
0 (x1) = p̂
f,h(x1).
Moreover, in view of Assumption 2.5, we also have that vh0 (x1) ∈ K
f,r,h(x1) and thus Kf,r,h(x1) 6= ∅.
Hence to establish (7) it suffices to make use of Lemma 2.3. The last part of the statement is an
immediate consequence of Definitions 2.2 and 2.10. ✷
The following definition hinges on Theorem 2.1.
Definition 2.11. If the set Kf,r,h(x1) is a singleton, then its unique element is denoted as ph(x1)
and called the hedger’s acceptable price for Cg.
Remark 2.2. From Theorem 2.1 and the proof of Lemma 2.3, we know that under Assumptions
2.2 and 2.4–2.6, the hedger’s acceptable price for Cg is well defined.
2.5 Counterparty’s Acceptable Price
Due to symmetric features of a game contract, to address the pricing problem for the counterparty,
it suffices to make appropriate modifications in the statements of results from Section 2.4. Note, in
particular, that the hedger is receiving the initial price p, whereas the counterparty is paying the price
provided, of course, if p is nonnegative. More formally, a number p is added to the initial endowment
of the hedger, but it is subtracted from the initial endowment of the counterparty. For this reason,
the counterparty searches for maximum superhedging and replication costs and minimum fair prices,
which are denoted as p̂s,c(x2), p̂
r,c(x2) and p˘
f,c(x2), respectively.
Definition 2.12. A quadruplet (p, ψ, σ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T × T is said to satisfy
(AO′) ⇐⇒ Vσ∧τ (x2 − p, ψ)− I(σ, τ) ≥ V bσ∧τ (x2)
and P
(
Vσ∧τ (x2 − p, ψ)− I(σ, τ) > V bσ∧τ (x2)
)
> 0,
(SH′) ⇐⇒ Vσ∧τ (x2 − p, ψ)− I(σ, τ) ≥ V bσ∧τ (x2),
(BE′) ⇐⇒ Vσ∧τ (x2 − p, ψ)− I(σ, τ) = V bσ∧τ (x2),
(NA′) ⇐⇒ either Vσ∧τ (x2 − p, ψ)− I(σ, τ) = V bσ∧τ (x2)
or P
(
Vσ∧τ (x2 − p, ψ)− I(σ, τ) < V bσ∧τ (x2)
)
> 0.
Of course, all other definitions and results formulated and established in Sections 2.1-2.4 for the
hedger have analogous (although not identical) versions for the counterparty. Since there is no need
to present all of them here, we only state the following important definitions.
Definition 2.13. If condition (BE′) is satisfied by (p, ψ, σ, τ), then a stopping time σ ∈ T is called
a counterparty’s break-even time for (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A).
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Definition 2.14. We say that a triplet (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T satisfies condition (SH′)
if the inequality Vτ∧t(x2 − p, ψ) − I(τ, t) ≥ V bτ∧t(x2) holds for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In that case, a triplet
(p, ψ, τ) is called a counterparty’s superhedging strategy in the extended marketMp(Cg).
We will identify conditions under which the counterparty’s maximum fair replication cost, de-
noted as p̂f,r,c(x2), is well defined and coincides with a solution to the counterparty’s optimal replica-
tion problem given by Definition 2.15. It is convenient to define xut := X
c
t+V
b
t (x2), x
l
t := X
h
t +V
b
t (x2)
and xmt := X
b
t + V
b
t (x2) for every t ∈ [0, T ] and we denote
J˜(x2, x
l, xu, xm, σ, τ) := I(σ, τ) + V bσ∧τ (x2) = J(x2, x
u, xl, xm, σ, τ)
= xlσ1{σ<τ} + x
u
τ1{τ<σ} + x
m
σ 1{τ=σ}. (9)
For brevity, the counterparty’s relative reward J˜(x2, x
l, xu, xm, σ, τ) is also denoted as Jc(σ, τ).
To formulate the counterparty’s optimal replication problem, we postulate that Assumptions 2.2
and 2.3 hold but with the process A replaced by −A. For a given process Y and a fixed stopping
time θ ∈ T , we denote by Ec0(Yθ) the unique y ∈ R such that there exists a strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(y,−A)
satisfying Vθ(y, ψ) = Yθ. It is also easy to check that
x2 − E
c
0(Yτ ) =
{
p ∈ R | ∃ψ ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A) : Vτ (x2 − p, ψ) = Yτ
}
. (10)
As for the hedger (see Assumption 2.4), we postulate that the game contract is replicable for the
counterparty.
Assumption 2.7. We assume that the process Jc is replicable for the counterparty, in the sense
that for a given x2 ∈ R and every σ, τ ∈ T there exists a pair (q, ψ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 + q,−A) such that
Vθ(x2 + q, ψ) = J
c(σ, τ).
For the counterparty, we have the following definition of the optimal replication, which corre-
sponds to Definition 2.10 for the hedger.
Definition 2.15. We say that a triplet (vc0(x2), σ
∗,c, τ∗,c) ∈ R × T × T is a solution to the coun-
terparty’s optimal replication problem for the game contract Cg if vc0(x2) = x2 − E
c
0(J
c(σ∗,c, τ∗,c))
where the stopping times σ∗,c and τ∗,c are such that
Ec0(J
c(σ∗,c, τ∗,c)) = min
τ∈T
max
σ∈T
Ec0(J
c(σ, τ)). (11)
Assumption 2.8. The counterparty’s optimal replication problem for the game contract Cg has a
solution (vc0(x2), σ
∗,c, τ∗,c). Furthermore, for p∗,c = vc0(x2) there exists ψ
∗ ∈ Ψ(x2 − p∗,c,−A) such
that the triplet (p∗,c, ψ∗, τ∗,c) satisfies (SH′) and the quadruplet (p∗,s, ψ∗, σ∗,c, τ∗,c) satisfies (BE′),
so that Kr,c(x2) 6= ∅.
In view of Definition 2.14, the triplet (p∗,c, ψ∗, σ∗,c) satisfies the inequality Vσ∗,c∧t(x2−p∗,c, ψ∗) ≥
Jc(σ∗,c, t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The proof of Lemma 2.7 is omitted since it is analogous to the proofs of
Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6.
Lemma 2.7. If Assumptions 2.2–2.3 and 2.7–2.8 are met, then we have ps,c(x2) ≤ v
c
0(x2) and
pf,c(x2) ≥ vc0(x2).
We are in a position to state the counterparty’s version of Theorem 2.1. The proof of Theorem
2.2 is based on similar arguments as the proof of Theorem 2.1 and thus it is not presented here.
Theorem 2.2. Let Assumptions 2.2–2.3 and 2.7–2.8 be satisfied. If p ∈ Ka,c(x2), then the inequality
p < vc0(x2) holds and thus p˘
f,c(x2) = v
c
0(x2). Moreover, K
f,r,c(x2) 6= ∅ and
vc0(x2) = p˘
f,c(x2) = p̂
f,r,c(x2) = p̂
s,c(x2). (12)
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The stopping time σ∗,c is a counterparty’s break-even time for the triplet (p̂f,r,c(x2), ψ
f,r,c, τ∗,c) where
a trading strategy ψ = ψf,r,c is implicitly given by equation (10) with (p, σ, τ) = (p̂f,r,c(x2), σ
∗,c, τ∗,c).
More explicitly, a trading strategy ψf,r,c belongs to Ψ(x2 − p̂f,r,c(x2),−A) and is such that
Vσ∗,c∧τ∗,c
(
x2 − p̂
f,r,c(x2), ψ
f,r,c
)
= Jh
(
σ∗,c, τ∗,c
)
.
As for the hedger, we can now define the counterparty’s acceptable price for Cg.
Definition 2.16. If the set Kf,r,c(x2) is a singleton, then its unique element is denoted as pc(x2)
and called the counterparty’s acceptable price for Cg.
Remark 2.3. Similarly to Remark 2.2, under Assumptions 2.2–2.3 and 2.7–2.8, one can show that
the counterparty’s acceptable price for the game contract Cg is well defined. Observe that unilateral
acceptable prices for Cg, as computed by the hedger and counterparty, will not coincide, in general.
3 A BSDE Approach to Game Options
In this section, we re-examine and extend a BSDE approach to the valuation of game options in
nonlinear market, which was initiated by Dumitrescu et al. [11]. Our main goal is to show that
unilateral acceptable prices for a game contract Cg can be characterized in terms of solutions to
DRBSDEs driven by a multi-dimensional continuous semimartingale S. In this section, we postulate
that the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ,A) satisfies the SDE
Vt = y −
∫ t
0
g(u, Vu, ξu) du+
∫ t
0
ξu dSu +At, (13)
where y ∈ R and a process ξ are given (recall also that A0 = 0). By applying Lemma 3.1 in [26]
with y1 = x + p < x + p
′ = y2, f1 = f2 = g and z = ξ, one can check that the condition of strict
monotonicity of wealth (see Assumption 2.2) is met when the dynamics of the wealth process are
given by (13), for instance, the mapping g = g(t, v, z) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to v.
3.1 Dynamics of the Wealth Process
We will briefly describe the main features of the mechanism of nonlinear trading, which generates
the wealth dynamics given by (13). We first introduce the notation for traded assets in our market
model, which are: cash accounts, risky assets, and funding accounts associated with risky assets. It
should be stressed that results in this section do not depend on the choice of a particular model for
primary assets and trading arrangements.
Let S = (S1, . . . , Sd) stand for the collection of prices of a family of d risky assets where the
processes S1, . . . , Sd are continuous semimartingales. Continuous processes of finite variation, de-
noted as B0,l and B0,b, represent the lending borrowing unsecured cash accounts, respectively. For
every j = 1, 2, . . . , d, we denote by Bj,l (respectively, Bj,b) the lending (respectively, borrowing)
funding account associated with the ith risky asset, and also assumed to be continuous processes
of finite variation. The financial interpretation of these accounts varies from case to case (for more
details, see [3, 5]). Let us denote by B the collection of all cash and funding accounts available
to a trader. For simplicity of presentation, we maintain our assumption that the hedger and the
counterparty have identical market conditions but it is clear that this assumption is not relevant
for our further developments and thus it can be easily relaxed. A trading strategy is an R3d+2-
valued, G-adapted process ϕ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd;ψ0,l, ψ0,b, . . . , ψd,l, ψd,b) where the components represent
all outstanding positions in the risky assets Sj, j = 1, 2, . . . , d, cash accounts B0,l, B0,b, and funding
accounts Bj,l, Bj,b, j = 1, 2, . . . , d for risky assets.
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Definition 3.1. We say trading strategy (y, ϕ) is self-financing for Cg and we write ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,A) if
the wealth process V (y, ϕ,A), which is given by
Vt(y, ϕ,A) =
d∑
j=1
ξjtS
j
t +
d∑
j=0
ψj,lt B
j,l
t +
d∑
j=0
ψj,bt B
j,b
t ,
satisfies, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Vt(y, ϕ,A) = y +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ξju dS
j
u +
d∑
j=0
∫ t
0
ψj,lu dB
j,l
u +
d∑
j=0
∫ t
0
ψj,bu dB
j,b
u +At
subject to additional constraints imposed on the components of ϕ. In particular, we postulate that
ψj,lt ≥ 0, ψ
j,b
t ≤ 0 and ψ
j,l
t ψ
j,b
t = 0 for all j = 0, 1, . . . , d and t ∈ [0, T ].
Due to additional trading constraints, which depend on the particular trading mechanism, the
choice of an initial value y and a process ξ is known to uniquely specify the wealth process of a self-
financing strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,A). In addition, one needs also to introduce some form of admissibility
of trading strategies and to postulate that the market model M = (B,S,Ψ(A)) where the class
Ψ(A) = ∪y∈RΨ(y,A) of admissible trading strategies is arbitrage-free in a suitable sense, for instance,
the market modelM can be assumed to be regular, in the sense of Bielecki et al. [3]. It is important
to notice that, due to the trading constraints, differential funding costs and possibly also some
additional adjustment processes, which are not explicitly stated in Definition 3.1, the dynamics of the
wealth process are nonlinear, in general. We refer the reader to Bielecki et al. [3, 5] for more details
on the self-financing property of a nonlinear trading strategy and to Nie and Rutkowski [35, 36, 37]
for explicit examples of nonlinear markets.
3.2 Comparison Properties of Nonlinear Evaluations
Our goal in this section is to examine the valuation and hedging of game contracts for the special
case where the wealth dynamics are driven by (13). Therefore, we henceforth postulate that the
wealth process V = V (y, ϕ,A) is governed by the SDE (13) where ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd) is given and the
mapping g satisfies some additional assumptions. To keep the presentation succinct and covering
several alternative nonlinear market models, we will directly postulate that the associated (possibly
doubly reflected) BSDEs enjoy desirable properties, such as: the existence, uniqueness, and the strict
comparison property for solutions to BSDEs, which are known to hold under various circumstances.
As was already mentioned, a particular instance of a market model given by (13) has been studied
in detail by Dumitrescu et al. [11].
We will use the standard terminology related to nonlinear evaluations generated by solutions to
BSDEs (see, e.g., Chapter 3 in Peng [38] or Section 4 in Peng [39]). Consider the following BSDE
on [0, s]
Yt = ζs +
∫ s
t
g(u, Yu, Zu) du −
∫ s
t
Zu dMu − (Hs −Ht), (14)
where ζs ∈ L2(Gs), M is a d-dimensional martingale, the process H is real-valued and G-adapted,
and the generator g : Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R is P ⊗ B(R) ⊗ B(Rd)/B(R)-measurable where P
is the σ-field of predictable sets on Ω × [0, T ]. Assume that the BSDE (14) has a unique solution
(Y, Z) in a suitable space of stochastic processes (see, e.g., [6, 35]). For every 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T and
ζs ∈ L2(Gs), we denote E
g,H
t,s (ζs) = Yt where (Y, Z) solves the BSDE (14) with Ys = ζs. Then the
system of operators Eg,Ht,s : L
2(Gs) → L2(Gt) is called the Eg,H-evaluation. It is worth noting that
a deterministic dates t ≤ s appearing in the BSDE (14) can be replaced by arbitrary G-stopping
times τ ≤ σ from T and thus the notion of the Eg,H -evaluation can be extended to stopping times
Eg,Hτ,σ : L
2(Gσ)→ L
2(Gτ ). The concept of the (strict) comparison property is of great importance in
the theory of BSDEs and nonlinear evaluations.
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Definition 3.2. We say that the comparison property of Eg,H holds if for every stopping time
τ ∈ T and random variables ζ1τ , ζ
2
τ ∈ L
2(Gτ ), the following property is valid: if ζ1τ ≥ ζ
2
τ then
Eg,H0,τ (ζ
1
τ ) ≥ E
g,H
0,τ (ζ
2
τ ). We say that the strict comparison property of E
g,H holds if for every τ ∈ T
and ζ1τ , ζ
2
τ ∈ L
2(Gτ ) if ζ1τ ≥ ζ
2
τ and ζ
1
τ 6= ζ
2
τ then E
g,H
0,τ (ζ
1
τ ) > E
g,H
0,τ (ζ
2
τ ).
The nonlinear evaluation given by solutions to the BSDE with M = S and H = A is interpreted
as the hedger’s nonlinear evaluation. Note that here S is the process of (possibly discounted) assets
prices and thus it is assumed to be a d-dimensional continuous martingale after a change of a
probability measure.
Definition 3.3. The nonlinear evaluation Eg,A associated with the BSDE
Yt = ζs +
∫ s
t
g(u, Yu, Zu) du −
∫ s
t
Zu dSu − (As −At) (15)
is denoted by Eg,h and called the hedger’s g-evaluation for A.
In Section 3.4 and 3.5, we address the hedger’s pricing problem and we work under the following
standing assumption.
Assumption 3.1. We postulate that:
(i) the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ,A) of any trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,A) satisfies (13),
(ii) for any fixed y ∈ R and any process ξ such that the stochastic integral in (13) is well defined,
the SDE (13) has a unique strong solution,
(iii) the strict monotonicity property holds for the wealth V (y, ϕ,A) (see Assumption 2.2),
(iv) for every (s, ζs) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(Gs) the BSDE (15) has a unique solution (Y, Z) on [0, s],
(v) the inequalities Xht < X
c
t and X
h
t ≤ X
b
t ≤ X
c
t hold for all t ∈ [0, T ].
In Sections 3.7 and 3.8, when studying the counterparty’s unilateral valuation and exercising
problems, we will use a slight modification of Assumption 3.1 with the process A replaced by −A
and with suitably modified assumptions about BSDEs and the counterparty’s g-evaluation Eg,c.
Remark 3.1. In view of Lemma 3.1 in Kim et al. [26] and condition (ii) in Assumption 3.1,
condition (iii) in Assumption 3.1 is not restrictive, since it is valid for every generator g. For explicit
assumptions about the generator g ensuring that the BSDE (15), where S is a multi-dimensional,
continuous, square-integrable martingale enjoying the predictable representation property, has a
unique solution and the strict comparison property of the hedger’s g-evaluation Eg,h holds, the
reader is referred to Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 in Nie and Rutkowski [35].
3.3 Doubly Reflected BSDEs
We first introduce the general notation for a doubly reflected BSDE (DRBSDE). Let ζl and ζu be
the two G-adapted, ca`dla`g processes such that ζlt < ζ
u
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Also, let ζ
m
T ∈ L
1(GT )
be a random variable such that ζlT ≤ ζ
m
T ≤ ζ
u
T . We work under Assumption 3.1 regarding the
dynamics of the wealth process and the properties of solutions to BSDE (g, ζmT ). In addition, we will
make additional assumptions about the existence and uniqueness of solutions to a DRBSDE for the
hedger and counterparty. They can be justified by results established in numerous papers; see, for
instance, Bayraktar and Yao [2], Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [8], Cre´pey and Matoussi [7], Essaky and
Hassani [17], Dumitrescu et al. [10], Grigorova et al. [18], Hamade`ne and Ouknine [21], Klimsiak
[27, 28] or Lepeltier and Xu [32] and the references therein. In particular, Assumption 3.2 is known
to be satisfied by several stochastic market models that were studied in papers on the so-called
valuation adjustments.
The definition of a solution to the DRBSDE with obstacles ζl and ζu, as stated in Assumption
3.2, is a minor modification of Definition 2.4 in Dumitrescu et al. [10]. For alternative versions of
the minimality (Skorokhod) conditions in the definition of a solution to DRBSDE with progressively
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measurable (or G-optional) obstacles, we refer to Klimsiak [27, 28] and Grigorova et al. [18]. Note
that we deliberately do not specify particular spaces of stochastic processes in which the components
Y and Z are searched for, since our further results do not depend on the choice of these spaces. Only
the properties of the processes L and U in a unique solution (Y, Z, L, U) to the hedger’s DRBSDE
(20) (and, analogously, of the processes ℓ and u in a unique solution (y, z, ℓ, u) to the counterparty’s
RBSDE (31)) will play an essential role and thus they are stated explicitly and analyzed in detail.
Assumption 3.2. The DRBSDE with parameters (g, ζl, ζu, ζmT )
−dYt = g(t, Yt, Zt) dt− Zt dSt − dAt + dLt − dUt, YT = ζmT ,
ζlt ≤ Yt ≤ ζ
u
t ,
∫ T
0
(Yt − ζlt) dL
c
t =
∫ T
0
(ζut − Yt) dU
c
t = 0,
∆Ld = −∆(Y −A)1{Y−=ζl−}, ∆U
d = ∆(Y −A)1{Y−=ζu−},
(16)
has a unique solution (Y, Z, L, U) where the processes L,U are G-predictable, ca`dla`g, nondecreasing
and such that L0 = U0 = 0. Moreover, the equalities L = L
c + Ld and U = U c + Ud give their
unique decompositions into continuous and jump components.
Dumitrescu et al. [10] provide a thorough examination of a particular instance of a DRBSDE
driven by a Brownian motion and a compensated random measure. They postulate, using the
present setup and notation, that the conditions ∆Ldτ = −∆(Yτ − Aτ )1{Yτ−=ζlτ−} and ∆U
d
τ =
∆(Yτ −Aτ )1{Yτ−=ζuτ−} are satisfied for every G-predictable stopping time τ . Since L and U are G-
predictable, nondecreasing processes, these conditions are equivalent to ∆Ld = −∆(Y −A)1{Y−=ζl−}
and ∆Ud = ∆(Y − A)1{Y−=ζu−} where the equality means that the processes in the right- and left-
hand sides are indistinguishable.
Remark 3.2. Using the arguments from the proof of Theorem 3.7 of Dumitrescu et al. [10], it is
easy to show that if the process ζl − A (respectively, −ζu + A) is left-upper-semicontinuous, then
the process L (respectively, U) is continuous. This important observation motivates Assumption 3.4
for the hedger, as well as the analogous Assumption 3.6 for the counterparty.
Let ζm be a G-adapted, ca`dla`g process such that ζlt ≤ ζ
m
t ≤ ζ
u
t for all t ∈ [0, T ] and let the payoff
J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ, τ) of a stochastic stopping game be given by
J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ, τ) := ζlτ1{τ<σ} + ζ
u
σ1{σ<τ} + ζ
m
τ 1{τ=σ}. (17)
Then the upper and lower values of the nonlinear Dynkin game associated with the hedger’s g-
evaluation Eg,h and with the payoff J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ, τ) are defined by the following expressions
V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) := inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ∧τ
(
J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ, τ)
)
,
Vh0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) := sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Eg,h0,σ∧τ
(
J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ, τ)
)
,
so that, manifestly, the inequality V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) ≥ Vh0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) is always true.
In view of the existing results on linear and nonlinear Dynkin games (see, in particular, Theorems
3.5, 3.7, 4.8 and 4.10 in Dumitrescu et al. [10])), it would be tempting to postulate that the above-
mentioned nonlinear Dynkin game has the value, in the sense that the equality V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) =
Vh0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) holds and, moreover, that the value of the game coincides with the initial value Y0 of
a solution to the DRBSDE (16), that is, the equality Y0 = V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) holds where
V h0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) := V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) = Vh0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm).
This relationship between the nonlinear Dynkin game with the payoff given by (17) and a solution
to the DRBSDE (16) is known to be satisfied in some setups and thus it could be postulated as well.
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However, as we will argue in what follows, in fact it would not be natural to postulate in the present
context that the nonlinear Dynkin game has a value, since its existence is completely immaterial
for unilateral valuation, hedging and exercising results. In fact, it suffices to either to assume or to
demonstrate for each particular instance of a nonlinear market model under study that the equality
Y0 = infσ∈T supτ∈T E
g,h
0,σ∧τ (J(ζ
l, ζu, ζm, σ, τ)) is valid for the hedger’s and counterparty’s nonlinear
Dynkin games.
Put another way, it is not necessary to postulate that the nonlinear Dynkin game associated with
the game contract has the value, since only the upper value V
h
0 (X
l, Xu, Xm) matters for the hedger.
Similarly, the counterparty’s price will be expressed in terms of the upper value V
c
0(x
l, xu, xm) where,
in general, the processes xl, xu and xm do not coincide with X l, Xu and Xm, respectively.
We conclude that it order to cover both the case of the hedger and that of the counterparty, it
is convenient to introduce the following assumption, which is supported by results in Dumitrescu et
al. [10] and Grigorova et al. [18].
Assumption 3.3. Let ζm be a G-adapted, ca`dla`g process such that ζlt ≤ ζ
m
t ≤ ζ
u
t for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We postulate that the following equalities hold
Y0 = V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) := inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ∧τ
(
J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ, τ)
)
= Eg,h0,σ∗∧τ∗
(
J(ζl, ζu, ζm, σ∗, τ∗)
)
where σ∗ := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = ζut } and τ
∗ := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = ζlt}.
Remark 3.3. In the special case when S = W is a Brownian motion, one may also refer to Bayraktar
and Yao [2] (see Assumptions (H.1)–(H.5) and Theorem 2.1 in [2]) for explicit assumptions ensuring
that a particular nonlinear Dynkin game has the value, a unique solution (Y, Z, L, U) exists in a
suitable space of stochastic processes, and the equality Y0 = V
h
0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm) holds (in fact, they show
that Y0 = Vh0 (ζ
l, ζu, ζm)).
3.4 Hedger’s Acceptable Price via DRBSDE
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, it is postulated throughout that Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are satisfied by the
hedger’s wealth and the hedger’s DRBSDE with parameters (g,X l, Xu, XmT ) where the processes
X l, Xu and the random variable XmT are given in the statement of Proposition 3.1 (see also Section
2.4). Note that the obstacles X l and Xu are ca`dla`g processes, since the processes Xh, Xc and
V b(x1) are assumed to be ca`dla`g. Finally, recall that the hedger’s relative reward J
h(σ, τ) =
J(x1, X
l, Xu, Xm, σ, τ) is given by (see equation (4))
Jh(σ, τ) := V bσ∧τ (x1)− I(σ, τ) = X
l
τ1{τ<σ} +X
u
σ1{σ<τ} +X
m
σ 1{τ=σ}. (18)
We start by analyzing the lower bound for the hedger’s superhedging costs. The following result
corresponds to Proposition 3.4 in Dumitrescu et al. [11] where, however, the nonlinear Dynkin game
associated with a particular game option is also shown to have the value.
Proposition 3.1. If the comparison property of the hedger’s g-evaluation holds and the process
−Xu + A is left-upper-semicontinuous, then the lower bound for the hedger’s superhedging costs
satisfies
ps,h(x1) = Y0 − x1 = inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ∧τ (J
h(σ, τ)) − x1, (19)
where (Y, Z, L, U) is the unique solution to the hedger’s DRBSDE with parameters (g,X l, Xu, XmT )
−dYt = g(t, Yt, Zt) dt− Zt dSt − dAt + dLt − dUt, YT = XmT ,
X lt ≤ Yt ≤ X
u
t ,
∫ T
0 (Yt −X
l
t) dL
c
t =
∫ T
0 (X
u
t − Yt) dU
c
t = 0,
∆Ld = −∆(Y −A)1{Y−=Xl−}, ∆U
d = ∆(Y −A)1{Y−=Xu−},
(20)
where X lt := V
b
t (x1)−X
c
t < X
u
t := V
b
t (x1)−X
h
t for all t ∈ [0, T ] and X
l
T ≤ X
m
T := V
b
T (x1)−X
b
T ≤
XuT .
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Proof. We fix x1 ∈ R and we first prove that ps,h(x1) ≤ Y0−x1. It suffices to show that for the initial
value p′ = Y0−x1, where Y0 is obtained from the DRBSDE (20), we can find a hedger’s superhedging
strategy. Our goal is thus to show that there exists a strategy (ϕ′, σ′) ∈ Ψ(x1+ p′, A)×T such that
the triplet (p′, ϕ′, σ′) fulfills condition (SH). To this end, we define the strategy (p′, ϕ′) = (Y0−x1, Z)
where (Y, Z, L, U) is a unique solution to the DRBSDE (20). Then, for a given process Z, the wealth
V = V (x1 + p
′, ϕ′) satisfies the forward SDE{
dVt = −g(t, Vt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt,
V0 = Y0.
(21)
Furthermore, if we set σh := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = Xut }, then using the continuity of U (see Remark
3.2), we obtain Uσh = 0, and thus, U = 0 on the stochastic interval [0, σ
h] , the DRBSDE (20) can
be viewed as a forward SDE for Y with given processes Z and L dYt = −g(t, Yt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt − dLt,Y0 = Y0, X lt ≤ Yt ≤ Xut , ∫ T0 (Yt −X lt) dLct = 0, ∆Ld = −∆(Y −A)1{Y−=Xl−}. (22)
From Lemma 3.1 in [26], we infer that Vt ≥ Yt for all t ∈ [0, σh] and thus, since Yt ≥ X lt for all
t ∈ [0, T ], we conclude that Vt ≥ X lt for all t ∈ [0, σ
h]. Moreover, Vσh ≥ Yσh = X
u
σh
≥ Xm
σh
.
Consequently, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Vσh∧t ≥ X
l
t1{t<σh} +X
u
σh1{σh<t} +X
m
t 1{t=σh} = J
h(σh, t),
which means that (p′, ϕ′, σ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z, σh) is a hedger’s superhedging strategy, in the sense of
Definition 2.3. We conclude that the inequality ps,h(x1) ≤ Y0 − x1 is valid.
It now remains to show that ps,h(x1) ≥ Y0 − x1. By the definition of a supremum, it suffices to
show that Y0 − x1 is a lower bound for any p ∈ Ks,h(x1). Let us take an arbitrary p ∈ Ks,h(x1).
Then there exists a pair (ϕ, σ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T such that, for all τ ∈ T ,
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ X
l
τ1{τ≤σ} +X
u
σ1{τ>σ} +X
m
σ 1{τ=σ} = J
h(σ, τ).
The comparison property of the hedger’s g-evaluation yields, for every τ ∈ T ,
x1 + p = E
g,h
0,σ∧τ
(
Vσ∧τ (x1 + p, ϕ)
)
≥ Eg,h0,σ∧τ (J
h(σ, τ)).
Since τ ∈ T is arbitrary, we obtain
x1 + p ≥ sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ∧τ (J
h(σ, τ)) ≥ inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ∧τ (J
h(σ, τ)) = Y0,
where the last equality follows from Assumption 3.3. We conclude that ps,h(x1) ≥ Y0 − x1, which
completes the proof of equality (19). ✷
For the justification of the next assumption, we refer to Remark 3.2.
Assumption 3.4. The processes X l − A and −Xu + A are left-upper-semicontinuous so that the
processes L and U in the solution (Y, Z, L, U) to the hedger’s DRBSDE (20) are continuous.
In the next result, we identify a hedger’s replicating strategy for Cg. Recall that the concept of a
hedger’s replicating strategy for Cg was introduced in Section 2.3. Note that when defining stopping
times, we henceforth adopt the convention that inf ∅ = T .
Proposition 3.2. If Assumption 3.4 is satisfied and the comparison property of the hedger’s g-
evaluation holds, then the following assertions are valid:
(i) the triplet (Y0−x1, Z, σh) is a hedger’s replicating strategy for Cg, where (Y, Z, L, U) is the unique
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solution to the DRBSDE (20) and the stopping time σh := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = Xut },
(ii) the hedger’s minimum superhedging and replication costs satisfy
p˘r,h(x1) = p˘
s,h(x1) = Y0 − x1, (23)
(iii) we have
p˘r,h(x1) = E
g,h
0,σh∧τh
(Jh(σh, τh))− x1,
where τh := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = X lt}.
Proof. We already know that Y0 − x1 = ps,h(x1) ≤ pr,h(x1) and thus to prove parts (i) and (ii), it
suffices to show that (p′, ϕ′, σ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z, σh) is a hedger’s replicating strategy for Cg. Noticing
that the right-continuity of the processes Y and Xu gives Yσh = X
u
σh
and the continuity of L and
U ensures that Lτh = 0 and Uσh = 0, hence the DRBSDE (20) can be viewed on [0, σ
h ∧ τh] as the
SDE (22) with a predetermined process Z and the process L satisfying Lt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, τh].
Consequently, from the uniqueness of a solution to the SDE (22), we obtain the equality Vt(Y0, Z) =
Yt on [0, σ
h ∧ τh]. In particular, P(τh = σh) = 0 (since X l < Xu) and
Vσh∧τh(Y0, Z) = Yσh∧τh = X
l
τh1{τh<σh} +X
u
σh1{τh>σh} = J
h(σh, τh),
which means that (Y0 − x1, Z, σh) is a hedger’s replicating strategy for Cg. Assertion (iii) is now an
immediate consequence of Assumption 3.3 applied to the hedger’s DRBSDE (20). ✷
The last step in solving the hedger’s valuation hinges on showing that the hedger’s minimum
replication cost is also his maximum fair price and to give alternative representations for the hedger’s
acceptable price. The proof of the next result is fairly similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1; it is
nevertheless given here for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 3.1. If Assumption 3.4 is satisfied and the strict comparison property of the hedger’s
g-evaluation holds, then the hedger’s acceptable price ph(x1) satisfies
ph(x1) = p˘
f,r,h(x1) = p̂
f,h(x1) = p˘
r,h(x1) = Y0 − x1 = V
h
0 (X
l, Xu, Xm)− x1.
Proof. It suffices to show that p˘r,h(x1) belongs to the setK
f,h(x1) or, equivalently, that the inequality
p˘r,h(x1) < p holds for every p ∈ Ka,h(x1). To this end, we will argue by contradiction. Let us denote
p′ = p˘r,h(x1). Assume that p
′ ∈ Ka,h(x1) so that there exists a strategy (ϕ′, σ′) ∈ Ψ(x1+ p′, A)×T
such that the triplet (p′, ϕ′, σ′) fulfills condition (AO). Then we have that, for every τ ∈ T ,
P
(
Vσ′∧τ (x1 + p
′, ϕ′) ≥ Jh(σ′, τ)
)
= 1, P
(
Vσ′∧τ (x1 + p
′, ϕ′) > Jh(σ′, τ)
)
> 0.
Setting τ = τh and using the strict comparison property of the hedger’s g-evaluation, we obtain
x1 + p
′ = Eg,h
0,σ′∧τh
(
Vσ′∧τh(x1 + p
′, ϕ′)
)
> Eg,h
0,σ′∧τh
(Jh(σ′, τh)).
However, in view of Assumption 3.3 and Proposition 3.2 (iii), we have that
Eg,h
0,σ′∧τh
(Jh(σ′, τh)) ≥ Eg,h
0,σh∧τh
(Jh(σh, τh)) = x1 + p
′
and thus we obtain
x1 + p
′ = Eg,h
0,σ′∧τh
(
Vσ′∧τh(x1 + p
′, ϕ′)
)
> Eg,h
0,σ′∧τh
(Jh(σ′, τh)) ≥ Eg,h
0,σh∧τh
(Jh(σh, τh)) = x1 + p
′,
which is a clear contradiction. Consequently, p̂r,h(x1) /∈ Ka,h(x1) and thus p̂r,h(x1) ∈ Kf,h(x1),
which means that the set Kf,r,h(x1) is nonempty. In view of Lemma 2.3, we conclude that p̂
f,h(x1) =
p˘r,h(x1) = p˘
f,r,h(x1) = p˘
s,h(x1). The assertion now follows from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. ✷
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3.5 Hedger’s Rational Cancellation Times
Our next goal is to provide some useful characterizations of the class all possible hedger’s rational
cancellation times for the game contract Cg.
Definition 3.4. We say that σ′ ∈ T is a hedger’s rational cancellation time for Cg if the contract
is traded at the hedger’s acceptable price ph(x1) at time 0 and there exists a trading strategy
ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p
h(x1), A) such that Vσ′∧τ (x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ) ≥ J
h(σ′, τ) for every τ ∈ T .
In view of the regularity of the wealth process and the process Jh(σ′, · ), the condition appearing
in Definition 3.4 can be restated as follows: the inequality Vσ′∧t(x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ) ≥ Jh(σ′, t) holds
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Assume that the game contract Cg is traded at time 0 at the hedger’s acceptable price ph(x1).
Then, from Theorem 3.1 and Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we know that there exists a triplet (ϕ′, σ′, τ ′) ∈
Ψ(x1 + p
h(x1), A) × T × T such that, on the one hand, (ph(x1), ϕ′, σ′) ∈ (SH) and, on the other
hand, (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′, τ ′) ∈ (BE). We thus see that the classes of all hedger’s rational cancellation
and break-even times (see Definition 3.5) are non-empty. We first aim to characterize the class
of all hedger’s rational cancellation times. To this end, we will need the following version of the
comparison property for solutions to BSDEs with generator g.
Assumption 3.5. The following extended comparison property for solutions to BSDEs holds: if for
j = 1, 2 {
−dY js = gj(s, Y
j
s , Z
j
s ) ds− Z
j
s dSs + dH
j
s ,
Y jτ = ζj ,
where τ ∈ T , ζ1 ≥ ζ2, g1(s, Y 2s , Z
2
s ) ≥ g2(s, Y
2
s , Z
2
s ) for all s ∈ [0, τ ] and the process H
1 − H2 is
nondecreasing, then Y 1s ≥ Y
2
s for every s ∈ [0, τ ].
Lemma 3.1. Let Assumption 3.5 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of the hedger’s
g-evaluation hold. Assume that (Y, Z, L, U) is the unique solution to the DRBSDE (20). If σ′ ∈ T
is a hedger’s rational cancellation time and τ ′ ∈ T is such that Lτ ′ = 0 and Yτ ′ = X lτ ′, then we have
Uσ′∧τ ′ = 0 and Yσ′∧τ ′ = J
h(σ′, τ ′).
Proof. Assume that σ′ ∈ T is a hedger’s rational cancellation time for Cg. Then there exists a
hedger’s trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + ph(x1), A) such that Vσ′∧τ (x1 + ph(x1), ϕ) ≥ Jh(σ′, τ) for
every counterparty’s exercise time τ ∈ T . The comparison property of the hedger’s g-evaluation
yields
x1 + p
h(x1) = E
g,h
0,σ′∧τ
(
Vσ′∧τ (x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ)
)
≥ Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′, τ))
and thus also
x1 + p
h(x1) ≥ sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′, τ)).
In particular, if τ ′ ∈ T is such that Yτ ′ = X lτ ′ , then
x1 + p
h(x1) ≥ sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′, τ)) ≥ Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(J
h(σ′, τ ′)) ≥ Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′), (24)
where the last inequality holds because it is possible to show that Jh(σ′, τ ′) ≥ Yσ′∧τ ′ . Indeed,
since the quadruplet (Y, Z, L, U) solves the DRBSDE (20), we have Yσ′∧τ ′ = Yτ ′ = X
l
τ ′ if τ
′ ≤ σ′,
Yσ′∧τ ′ = Yσ′ ≤ Xuσ′ if σ
′ < τ ′ ≤ T and Yσ′∧τ ′ = XmT if τ
′ = σ′ = T . Since
Jh(σ′, τ ′) = X lτ ′1{τ ′<σ′} +X
u
σ1{σ′<τ ′} +X
m
σ 1{τ ′=σ′},
X l < Xu and X l ≤ Xm ≤ Xu, it is now easy to see that Jh(σ′, τ ′) ≥ Yσ′∧τ ′ . Recalling that
ph(x1) = Y0 − x1, we obtain from (24)
Y0 ≥ E
g,h
0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′). (25)
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By assumption about τ ′, we also have that Lτ ′ = 0 holds and thus the DRBSDE (20) for 0 ≤ r ≤
t ≤ τ ′ can be written as{
−dYr = g(r, Yr, Zr) dr − Zr dSr − dAt − dUr, Yt = Yt,
X lr ≤ Yr ≤ X
u
r ,
∫ t
0
(Xur − Yr) dU
c
r = 0, ∆U
d = ∆(Y −A)1{Y−=Xu−}.
Using Assumption 3.5, we obtain the inequality Eg,hs,t (Yt) ≥ Ys for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ τ
′, which means that
the process Y is an Eg,h-submartingale on [0, τ ′]. From (25) and the postulated strict comparison
property of the hedger’s g-evaluation, we will now deduce that for every 0 ≤ s ≤ σ′ ∧ τ ′
Eg,hs,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = Ys. (26)
Suppose, on the contrary, that equality (26) is not true. Then the strict comparison property of the
hedger’s g-evaluation would yield
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = E
g,h
0,s (E
g,h
s,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′)) > E
g,h
0,s (Ys) ≥ Y0,
which would contradict (25). From (26), we have Eg,ht,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = Yt and thus, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤
σ′ ∧ τ ′,
Eg,hs,t (Yt) = E
g,h
s,t (E
g,h
t,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′)) = E
g,h
s,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = Ys,
where the last equality also comes from (26). We have thus shown that Y is an Eg,h-martingale on
[0, σ′ ∧ τ ′] so that Uσ′∧τ ′ = 0 and Uσ′∧t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, τ ′]. In particular, we have
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = Y0. (27)
By combining (24) with (27), we get
Y0 = x1 + p
h(x1) = E
g,h
0,σ′∧τ ′
(
Vσ′∧τ ′(x1 + p, ϕ)
)
= sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′, τ))
= Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(J
h(σ′, τ ′)) = Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′).
Since we have shown that Jh(σ′, τ ′) ≥ Yσ′∧τ ′ , using the strict comparison property of the hedger’s
g-evaluation, we obtain the desired equality Jh(σ′, τ ′) = Yσ′∧τ ′ . ✷
We will study two possible exercise times for the counterparty
τh := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = X
l
t}, τ¯
h := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Lt > 0},
which are of a special interest for the hedger’s valuation and rational cancellation problems, as
emphasized by the superscript h.
Proposition 3.3. Let Assumptions 3.4–3.5 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of the
hedger’s g-evaluation hold. Then the following assertions are true:
(i) if a stopping time σ′ ∈ T is such that (a) Uσ′ = 0 and (b) Yσ′ = Xuσ′ , then σ
′ is a hedger’s
rational cancellation time,
(ii) if σ′ is a hedger’s rational cancellation time, then Uσ′∧τh = Uσ′∧τ¯h = 0, Yσ′∧τh = J
h(σ′, τh)
and Yσ′∧τ¯h = J
h(σ′, τ¯h).
Proof. (i) If condition (a) is satisfied then, arguing as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we obtain
the existence of a hedger’s trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + ph(x1), A) such that the wealth process
V = V (x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ, A) satisfies Vt ≥ Yt ≥ X
l
t for all t ∈ [0, σ
′]. Moreover, since (b) holds, we get
Vσ′ ≥ Yσ′ = Xuσ′ ≥ X
m
σ′ and, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Vσ′∧t ≥ X
l
t1{t<σ′} +X
u
σ′1{σ′<t} +X
m
σ′1{σ′=t} = J
h(σ′, t).
It is thus clear that σ′ is a hedger’s rational cancellation time for Cg.
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(ii) In view of Lemma 3.1, it suffices to show that Lτh = Lτ¯h = 0, Yτh = X
l
τh
and Yτ¯h = X
l
τ¯h
. The
equality Yτh = X
l
τh
follows from the definition of τh and the right-continuity of processes X l and
Y . Hence, in view of (20), from the continuity of L we obtain Lτh = 0. We will now show that
Lτ¯h = 0 and Yτ¯h = X
l
τ¯h
. For an arbitrary ε > 0, there exists a δ ∈ [0, ε] such that Lτ¯h+δ > 0 and
thus, since
∫ T
0
(Yt − X lt) dLt = 0, there exists a δ1 ∈ [0, δ] such that Yτ¯h+δ1 = X
l
τ¯h+δ1
. From the
right-continuity of Y and X l and the fact that ε and 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ ≤ ε are arbitrary, we deduce that
Yτ¯h = X
l
τ¯h
. Moreover, since Lt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, τ¯h), in view of the continuity of L, we also have
that Lτ¯h = 0. ✷
Corollary 3.1. Let Assumptions 3.4–3.5 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of the
hedger’s g-evaluation hold. Then the stopping times σh and σ¯h, which are given by
σh := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = X
u
t }, σ¯
h := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Ut > 0},
are hedger’s rational cancellation times.
Proof. We first consider the stopping time σh. From the right-continuity of Y and Xu, we obtain
the equality Yσh = X
u
σh
. Moreover, from the definition of σh, we have Yt < X
u
t for t ∈ [0, σ
h) and
thus Ut = 0 for all t ∈ [0, σh] observing that U is continuous. Using part (i) in Proposition 3.3, we
conclude that σh is a hedger’s rational cancellation time. Let us now focus on the stopping time
σ¯h. Then, similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.3, using the right-continuity of Y and Xu, we can
show that Yσ¯h = X
u
σ¯h
and Ut = 0 for all t ∈ [0, σ¯
h]. Thus, using again part (i) in Proposition 3.3,
we conclude that σ¯h is also one of hedger’s rational cancellation times. ✷
In the case of an American option and a nonlinear market, it is easy to characterize the earliest
and latest holder’s rational exercise times for the holder of the option (see, for instance, Section
3.6 in Kim et al. [26]). In contrast, since a game contract can be stopped by either of the two
parties at any instance, it is much harder to provide a full characterization of the earliest and latest
rational cancellation times for the hedger and, by the same token, the earliest and latest rational
exercise times for the counterparty. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that the hedger’s rational
cancellation times σh and σ¯h enjoy the property of being, at least in some special circumstances,
the earliest and the latest among all hedger’s rational cancellation times.
Corollary 3.2. Let Assumptions 3.4–3.5 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of the
hedger’s g-evaluation hold. Then the following assertions are true:
(i) if σ′ is a hedger’s rational cancellation time such that σ′ ≤ σh on the event Eh := {σh ≤ τ¯h},
then σ′ = σh on Eh,
(ii) if σ′ is a hedger’s rational cancellation time such that σ′ ≥ σ¯h on the event E¯h := {σ¯h < τ¯h},
then σ′ = σ¯h on E¯h.
Proof. (i) We argue by contradiction. Let σ′ be a stopping time such that σ′ ≤ σh on the event Eh
and P({σ′ < σh} ∩ Eh) > 0. In view of the assumption that τ¯h ≥ σh on Eh, we have σ′ ∧ τ¯h = σ′
on Eh. Due to the definition of the stopping time σh, we have that Yσ′ < X
u
σ′ on {σ
′ < σh}. Thus
Yσ′∧τ¯h = Yσ′ < X
u
σ′ = X
u
σ′∧τ¯h = J
h(σ′, τ¯h) on {σ′ < σh} ∩ Eh where the last equality follows
from (18). In view of part (ii) in Proposition 3.3, we conclude that σ′ cannot be a hedger’s rational
cancellation time.
(ii) Once again we argue by contradiction. Let σ′ be a stopping time such that σ′ ≥ σ¯h on the event
E¯h and P({σ′ > σ¯h}∩ E¯h) > 0. Since manifestly τ¯h > σ¯h on E¯h, we have that P(σ′ ∧ τ¯h > σ¯h) > 0.
Due to the definition of σ¯h, this means that P(Uσ′∧τ¯h > 0) > 0 and thus, in view of part (ii) in
Proposition 3.3, it is clear that σ′ cannot be a hedger’s rational cancellation time. ✷
From Corollary 3.2 it follows, in particular, that if the inequality τ¯h ≥ σh holds, then σh is
the earliest among all hedger’s rational cancellation times, that is, if σ′ is any hedger’s rational
cancellation time such that σ′ ≤ σh, then σ′ = σh. Similarly, if τ¯h > σ¯h, then σ¯h is the latest among
all hedger’s rational cancellation times, that is, if σ′ is any hedger’s rational cancellation time such
that σ′ ≥ σ¯h, then the equality σ′ = σ¯h holds.
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3.6 Hedger’s Break-Even Times
In the next step we will examine the set of hedger’s break-even times, which are introduced in
Definition 3.5. Obviously, a hedger’s break-even time is in fact a particular exercise time selected by
the counterparty, but its name is aimed to emphasize that the choice of that time by the counterparty
affects in a very special way the hedger’s financial outcome. In other words, it is a particular
exercise time related to the hedger’s unilateral valuation problem, but it is usually meaningless for
the counterparty’s unilateral valuation and exercising problems in a general nonlinear framework.
Definition 3.5. A stopping time τ ∈ T is called a hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (p, ϕ, σ) ∈
R×Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T if condition (BE) is satisfied by the quadruplet (p, ϕ, σ, τ).
Remark 3.4. Using the symmetry of the problem, we will also analyze in Section 3.8 the counter-
party’s rational exercise time, which is chosen by the counterparty, and the counterparty’s break-even
time, which is selected by the hedger, but is relevant for the financial outcome of the counterparty.
In the next result, we provide several alternative characterizations of all hedger’s break-even
times associated with the hedger’s replicating strategy (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z, σh). Note that
the stopping time σ′ = σh is a hedger’s rational cancellation time and ϕ′ = Z where the quadruplet
(Y, Z, L, U) is a unique solution to the DRBSDE (20). Recall that the stopping time τh is given by
τh := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = X lt}.
Proposition 3.4. Let Assumption 3.5 be satisfied and (Y, Z, L, U) be the unique solution to the
hedger’s DRBSDE (20) where the process −Xu+A is assumed to be left-upper-semicontinuous. For
(ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z, σh), the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) a stopping time τ ′ ∈ T is a hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (ph(x1), ϕ′, σ′) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 +
ph(x1), A)× T ,
(ii) the quadruplet (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′, τ ′) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + ph(x1), A)× T × T satisfies condition (NA),
(iii) the equality Vσ′∧τ ′(x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ
′) = Jh(σ′, τ ′) holds,
(iv) the equalities Yσ′∧τ ′ = J
h(σ′ ∧ τ ′) and Lτ ′∧σ′ = Uσ′ = 0 hold and thus the process Y is an
Eg,h-martingale on [0, σ′ ∧ τ ′],
(v) a stopping time τ ′ ∈ T is a solution to the following nonlinear optimal stopping problem: find
τ ′ ∈ T such that
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′
(
Jh(σ′, τ ′)
)
= sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′, τ)).
Moreover, if the process X l −A is left-upper-semicontinuous, then τh is a hedger’s break-even time
for the triplet (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′). If, in addition, the inequality σ′ ≥ τh holds, then τh is the earliest
hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′).
Proof. From results established in Section 2.3, we note that since (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′) is a hedger’s
replicating strategy (see Proposition 3.2), it is also his superhedging strategy, and thus it is clear
that assertions (i), (ii) and (iii) are indeed equivalent.
(iii)⇒ (iv). From the proof of Proposition 3.1, we know that Vt(x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ
′) ≥ Yt ≥ X
l
t for
all t ∈ [0, σ′] and thus, in particular, Vσ′∧τ ′(x1 + ph(x1), ϕ′) ≥ Yσ′∧τ ′ . Moreover, since (Y, Z, L, U)
solves the DRBSDE (20), we have X l ≤ Y ≤ Xu and Yσ′ = Xuσ′ ≥ X
m
σ′ . Therefore,
Vσ′∧τ ′(x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ
′) ≥ Yσ′∧τ ′ ≥ X
l
τ ′1{τ ′<σ′} +X
u
σ′1{σ′<τ ′} +X
m
σ′1{σ′=τ ′} = J
h(σ′, τ ′). (28)
From (iii), Vσ′∧τ ′(x1+p
h(x1), ϕ
′) = Yσ′∧τ ′ = J
h(σ′, τ ′), which is Vσ′∧τ ′(Y0, ϕ
′) = Yσ′∧τ ′ = J
h(σ′, τ ′)
by recalling that ph(x1) = Y0 − x1. Moreover, since the process V = V (Y0, ϕ′) satisfies the SDE
(21), it is easy to see that the process V (Y0, ϕ
′) is an Eg,h-martingale. We thus have
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = E
g,h
0,σ′∧τ ′
(
Vσ′∧τ ′(Y0, ϕ
′)
)
= Y0. (29)
22 E. Kim, T. Nie and M. Rutkowski
The process Y solves the DRBSDE (20), which can be written on 0 ≤ r ≤ t ≤ σ′ in the following
way (recall that Uσ′ = 0) dYr = −g(r, Yr, Zr) dr + Zr dSr + dAt − dLr,Yt = Yt, X lr ≤ Yr ≤ Xur , ∫ t0 (Yr −X lr) dLcr = 0, ∆Ld = −∆(Y −A)1{Y−=Xl−}.
Using Assumption 3.5, we obtain Eg,hs∧σ′,t∧σ′(Yt∧σ′ ) ≤ Ys∧σ′ for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , so that Y is an
Eg,h-supermartingale on the stochastic interval [0, σ′]. We now claim that, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ τ ′,
Eg,hs∧σ′,τ ′∧σ′(Yτ ′∧σ′) = Ys∧σ′ . (30)
Suppose, on the contrary, that the equality (30) fails to hold. In that case, the strict comparison
property of the hedger’s g-evaluation would yield
Eg,h0,τ ′∧σ′(Yτ ′∧σ′) = E
g,h
0,s∧σ′(E
g,h
s∧σ′,τ ′∧σ′(Yτ ′∧σ′)) < E
g,h
0,s∧σ′(Ys∧σ′ ) ≤ Y0,
which manifestly contradicts (29). Next, we claim that Eg,hs∧σ′,t∧σ′(Yt∧σ′ ) = Ys∧σ′ for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
which means that Y is an Eg,h-martingale on [0, τ ′ ∧ σ′] and thus Lτ ′∧σ′ = 0. To establish this
property, we note that (30) gives Eg,ht∧σ′,τ ′∧σ′(Yτ ′∧σ′) = Yt∧σ′ and thus, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
Eg,hs∧σ′,t∧σ′(Yt∧σ′) = E
g,h
s∧σ′,t∧σ′(E
g,h
t∧σ′,τ ′∧σ′(Yτ ′∧σ′)) = E
g,h
s∧σ′,τ ′∧σ′(Yτ ′∧σ′) = Ys∧σ′ ,
where the last equality comes from (30).
(iv)⇒ (iii). We observe that Yσ′∧τ ′ = Jh(σ′ ∧ τ ′), Lτ ′∧σ′ = Uσ′ = 0 and (Y, Z, L, U) solves the
DRBSDE (20), which thus reduces to the following BSDE on the stochastic interval [0, σ′ ∧ τ ′]{
−dYr = g(r, Yr, Zr) dr − Zr dSr − dAt,
Yσ′∧τ ′ = J
h(σ′ ∧ τ ′).
Given the process Z, the above BSDE can be formally rewritten as the (forward) SDE, for all
r ∈ [0, τ ′], {
dYr = −g(r, Yr, Zr) dr + Zr dSr + dAt,
Y0 = Y0.
Recall that V (x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ
′) = V (Y0, Z) satisfies the following SDE, for all r ∈ [0, T ],{
dVr = −g(r, Vr, Zr) dr + Zr dSr + dAt,
V0 = Y0.
From the uniqueness of a solution to the SDE, we deduce that V (Y0, Z) and Y coincide on [0, σ
′∧τ ′].
In particular, Vσ′∧τ ′(x1 + p
h(x1), ϕ
′) = Yσ′∧τ ′ = J
h(σ′ ∧ τ ′).
(iv)⇔ (v). First, from (iv) we know that Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(J
h(σ′ ∧ τ ′)) = Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′) = Y0. Observe that
Assumption 3.3 yields Y0 = supτ∈T E
g,h
0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′ ∧ τ)) and thus
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(J
h(σ′ ∧ τ ′)) = sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′ ∧ τ)).
Conversely, if (v) holds, then Assumption 3.3 gives
Y0 = E
g,h
0,σ′∧τ ′(J
h(σ′ ∧ τ ′)) ≤ Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′(Yσ′∧τ ′)
where the last inequality is a consequence of (28). Thus, similarly as for the implication (iii)⇒(iv),
one can show (iv) holds. This completes the proof of the equivalence (iv)⇔ (v).
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Let us show that the stopping time τh is a hedger’s break-even time. From the right-continuity
of Y and X , we deduce that Yτh = X
l
τh
. Moreover, from the definition of τh, we have Yt > X
l
t for
t ∈ [0, τh) and thus Lt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, τh]. Therefore, we have Yτh = X
l
τh
and Lτh = 0, that is,
(iv) holds with τ ′ = τh. Hence, from the above equivalences (in particular, (iv)⇔ (i)), we infer that
τh is a hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′) ∈ R × Ψ(x1 + ph(x1), A) × T . One
can also provide another simple argument: from Assumption 3.3, we have that τh is a solution to
the following nonlinear optimal stopping problem: find τ ′ ∈ T such that
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ ′
(
Jh(σ′, τh)
)
= sup
τ∈T
Eg,h0,σ′∧τ (J
h(σ′, τ))
and, from the equivalence (v) ⇔ (i), we infer that τh is a hedger’s break-even time for the triplet
(ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′).
To complete the proof of the proposition, it remains to show that if, in addition, the inequality
σ′ ≥ τh holds, then τh is the earliest hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (ph(x1), ϕ′, σ′). We
argue by contradiction. Let τ ′ be any hedger’s break-even time for the triplet (ph(x1), ϕ
′, σ′) such
that τ ′ ≤ τh and P({τ ′ < τh}) > 0. Then, from (iv) and σ′ ≥ τh ≥ τ ′, it holds that Yτ ′ = X
l
τ ′ on
{τ ′ < τh}, which clearly contradicts the definition of τh. ✷
3.7 Counterparty’s Acceptable Price via DRBSDE
In Sections 3.7 and 3.8, it is postulated without further mentioning that Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are
satisfied by the counterparty’s wealth processes associated with the process −A and the counter-
party’s DRBSDE (31). Observe that the the counterparty’s DRBSDE is specified in the manner
analogous to the hedger’s equation (20) and the counterparty’s g-evaluation Eg,c is defined in the
same way as the hedger’s g-evaluation Eg,h but with the process A replaced by the process −A in
the BSDE (15).
In particular, the lower and upper obstacles in the counterparty’s DRBSDE are ca`dla`g processes
xl and xu given by xlt := X
h
t + V
b
t (x2) < x
u
t := X
c
t + V
b
t (x2) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and the terminal
value xmT is such that x
l
T ≤ x
m
T := X
b
T + V
b
T (x2) ≤ x
u
T . An application of Assumption 3.2 to the
counterparty’s DRBSDE ensures the existence of a unique solution (y, z, ℓ, u) to the DRBSDE (31)
with parameters (g, xl, xu, xmT )
−dyt = g(t, yt, zt) dt− zt dSt + dAt + dℓt − dut, yT = xmT ,
xlt ≤ yt ≤ x
u
t ,
∫ T
0 (yt − x
l
t) dℓ
c
t =
∫ T
0 (x
u
t − yt) du
c
t = 0,
∆ℓd = −∆(y +A)1{y−=ζl−}, ∆u
d = ∆(y +A)1{y−=ζu−},
(31)
where, in particular, ℓ and u are G-predictable, ca`dla`g, nondecreasing processes such that ℓ0 = u0 =
0. Furthermore, ℓ = ℓc + ℓd and u = uc + ud give their unique decompositions into continuous and
jump components.
Recall also that the counterparty’s relative reward Jc(σ, τ) = J˜(x1, x
l, xu, xm, σ, τ) is given by
equation (9), that is,
Jc(σ, τ) = I(σ, τ) + V bσ∧τ (x2) = x
l
σ1{σ<τ} + x
u
τ1{τ<σ} + x
m
σ 1{τ=σ}.
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we have established several results for the hedger. Since the two uni-
lateral valuation and hedging problems are in some sense symmetric, it is clear that the analogous
results for the counterparty should be valid as well and thus it suffices to give their statements
without proofs. We first state the counterparty’s version of Proposition 3.1, which furnishes the link
between the counterparty’s superhedging costs and the unique solution (y, z, ℓ, u) to the counter-
party’s DRBSDE (31).
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Proposition 3.5. Let the process −xu−A be left-upper-semicontinuous. If the comparison property
of the counterparty’s g-evaluation holds, then the upper bound for the counterparty’s superhedging
costs satisfies
ps,c(x2) = x2 − y0 = x2 − inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈T
Eg,c0,σ∧τ (J
c(σ, τ)).
In the next result, which corresponds to Proposition 3.2 and gives a counterparty’s replicating
strategy for Cg, we will need the following analogue of Assumption 3.4.
Assumption 3.6. The processes xl + A and −xu − A are left-upper-semicontinuous so that the
processes ℓ and u in the solution (y, z, ℓ, u) to the counterparty’s DRBSDE (31) are continuous.
We define the hedger’s cancellation time σc and the counterparty’s exercise time τc by setting
τc := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] | yt = x
u
t }, σ
c := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] | yt = x
l
t}.
Proposition 3.6. Let Assumption 3.6 be satisfied. If the comparison property of the counterparty’s
g-evaluation holds, then the following assertions are valid:
(i) (x2 − y0, z, τc) is a counterparty’s replicating strategy for Cg,
(ii) the counterparty’s maximum superhedging and replication costs satisfy
p̂r,c(x2) = p̂
s,c(x2) = x2 − y0 = x2 − E
g,c
0,σc∧τc(J
c(σc, τc)).
Let V
c
0(x
l, xu, xm) stand for the upper value for the counterparty’s nonlinear Dynkin game with
the payoff Jc(σ, τ), that is,
V
c
0(x
l, xu, xm) := inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈T
Eg,c0,σ∧τ (J
c(σ, τ)).
The following result, which is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3.1, shows that the coun-
terparty’s maximum replication cost coincides with his minimum fair price and furnishes alternative
representations for the counterparty’s acceptable price pc(x2).
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumption 3.6 be satisfied. If the strict comparison property of the counter-
party’s g-evaluation holds, then the unique counterparty’s acceptable price pc(x2) satisfies
pc(x2) = p̂
f,r,c(x2) = p̂
r,c(x2) = p˘
f,c(x2) = x2 − y0 = x2 − V
c
0(x
l, xu, xm).
3.8 Counterparty’s Rational Exercise and Break-Even Times
Let us state the counterparty’s versions of Definition 3.4 and Proposition 3.3.
Definition 3.6. A stopping time τ ′ ∈ T is a counterparty’s rational exercise time for Cg if the
contract is traded at the counterparty’s acceptable price pc(x2) at time 0 and there exists a trading
strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(x2 − pc(x2),−A) such that Vτ ′(x2 − pc(x2), ψ) ≥ Jc(σ, τ ′) for every σ ∈ T .
The following hedger’s cancellation times
σc := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] | yt = x
l
t}, σ¯
c := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] | ℓt > 0},
play an important role in the counterparty’s valuation problem and thus they are designated by the
superscript c.
Proposition 3.7. Let Assumption 3.5–3.6 be satisfied. If the strict comparison property of the
counterparty’s g-evaluation holds, then the following assertions are true:
(i) if a stopping time τ ′ ∈ T is such that (a) uτ ′ = 0 and (b) yτ ′ = xuτ ′ , then τ
′ is a counterparty’s
rational exercise time,
(ii) if τ ′ ∈ T is a counterparty’s rational exercise time, then uσc∧τ ′ = uσ¯c∧τ ′ = 0, Yσc∧τ ′ = J
c(σc, τ ′)
and Yσ¯c∧τ ′ = J
c(σ¯c, τ ′).
Nonlinear Pricing of Game Options 25
The following results correspond to Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Corollary 3.3. Let Assumptions 3.5–3.6 be satisfied. If the strict comparison property of the coun-
terparty’s g-evaluation holds, then the stopping times τc and τ¯c given by
τc := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] | yt = x
u
t }, τ¯
c := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] |ut > 0},
are counterparty’s rational exercise times.
Corollary 3.4. Let Assumptions 3.5–3.6 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of the
counterparty’s g-evaluation hold. Then the following assertions are true:
(i) if τ ′ is a counterparty’s rational exercise time such that τ ′ ≤ τc on the event Ec := {τc ≤ σ¯c},
then τ ′ = τc on Ec,
(ii) if τ ′ is a counterparty’s rational exercise time such that τ ′ ≥ τ¯c on the event E¯c := {τ¯c < σ¯c},
then τ ′ = τ¯c on E¯c.
In particular, if σ¯c ≥ τc, then τc is the earliest among all counterparty’s rational exercise times,
that is, if τ ′ is any counterparty’s rational exercise time such that τ ′ ≤ τc, then τ ′ = τc. Moreover,
if σ¯c > τ¯c, then τ¯c is the latest among all counterparty’s rational exercise times, that is, if τ ′ is any
counterparty’s rational exercise time such that τ ′ ≥ τ¯c, then τ ′ = τ¯c.
As expected, the definition of the counterparty’s break-even time mimics the one for the hedger.
Observe that a counterparty’s break-even time is associated with a solution to the counterparty’s
unilateral valuation problem (but, of course, not with the hedger’s valuation problem, in general,
unless we deal with a linear market model).
Definition 3.7. If condition (BE′) is satisfied by a quadruplet (p, ψ, σ, τ), then σ ∈ T is called a
counterparty’s break-even time for the triplet (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T .
We conclude this work by considering the counterparty’s replicating strategy (pc(x2), ψ
′, τ ′) =
(x2 − y0, z, τ
c), where the quadruplet (y, z, ℓ, u) is a solution to the DRBSDE (31) and the stopping
time τ ′ = τc is a counterparty’s rational exercise time. The proof of Proposition 3.8, which provides
several alternative characterizations of counterparty’s break-even times associated with the triplet
(x2 − y0, z, τc), is exactly the same as the proof of Proposition 3.4 and thus it is omitted.
Proposition 3.8. Let (y, z, ℓ, u) be the unique solution to the counterparty’s DRBSDE (31) where
the process −xu−A is assumed to be left-upper-semicontinuous. For (pc(x2), ψ′, τ ′) = (x2−y0, z, τc),
the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) a stopping time σ′ ∈ T is a counterparty’s break-even time for the triplet (pc(x2), ψ′, τ ′) ∈
R×Ψ(x2 − pc(x2),−A)× T , that is, Vσ′∧τ ′(x2 − pc(x2), ϕ′) = Jc(σ′, τ ′),
(ii) the quadruplet (pc(x2), ψ
′, σ′, τ ′) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p
c(x2),−A)× T × T fulfills condition (NA
′),
(iii) the equality yσ′∧τ ′ = J
c(σ′ ∧ τ ′) holds,
(iv) the equalities yσ′∧τ ′ = J
c(σ′ ∧ τ ′) and ℓσ′∧τ ′ = uτ ′ = 0 hold and thus the process y is an Eg,c-
martingale on [0, σ′ ∧ τ ′],
(v) a stopping time σ′ ∈ T is a solution to the following nonlinear optimal stopping problem: find
σ′ ∈ T such that
Eg,c0,σ′∧τ ′
(
Jc(σ′, τ ′)
)
= sup
σ∈T
Eg,c0,σ∧τ ′
(
Jc(σ, τ ′)
)
.
Furthermore, if the process xl + A is left-upper-semicontinuous, then σc is a counterparty’s break-
even time for the triplet (pc(x2), ψ
′, τ ′). If, in addition, the inequality τ ′ ≥ σc holds, then σc is the
earliest counterparty’s break-even time for the triplet (pc(x2), ψ
′, τ ′).
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